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Introduction
Current financial turbulence and uncertainty in Europe reinforce arguments in favour of 
encouraging economic and monetary cooperation but, at the same time, make such cooperation 
more difficult. Since the rejection by Denmark of the Maastricht Treaty, five Community 
currencies (those of Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom) have devalued, two 
of them have left the system (United Kingdom and Italy) and others have come under serious 
pressure (Denmark and France). The difficulties cannot be ignored. An important component 
of the problem is the management and control of public expenditure. Adjustments to monetary 
parameters are necessary to solve urgent problems, but they are not sufficient to build a solid 
EMU. Excessive use of monetary instruments, with persistent budgetary deficits, is one of the 
main reasons for the current crisis. Long-lasting financial-market stability requires budgetary 
discipline. Serious movement towards EMU cannot take place successfully until the budgetary 
performance of Member States has converged.
The European Monetary Union will function properly when Member States accept and work 
under nominal convergence requirements, among other things, conditions on inflation, interest 
rates, etc., which means having similar levels of budget deficits. Externalities and 
interdependence form the basis of the following important arguments identified in support of 
fiscal cohesion in the European Community: the need for a global European fiscal policy 
beyond the aggregation of 12 individually decided budgetary positions; the need to avoid the 
disproportionate use of Community savings by one Member State; a possible bias towards lack 
of fiscal restraint'; and the need for convergence in budgetary positions during the transition 
period (A. Lamfalussy, 1989, p. 91). Although the need for fiscal coordination and for 
controlling national spending in particular have been widely justified, relatively little attention 
has been paid to identifying and analyzing concrete measures to make this feasible. Most 
studies on these aspects of the Economic Monetary Union have been concerned with questions 
as to why the need exist for fiscal convergence and to what degree is it desirable. Attention has 
only recently been focused on examining what budgetary measures (rules, procedures, 
structures) can be taken by the Commission or finance ministries for European convergence.
This last question was EIPA's main global concern when organizing the workshop Can Norms 
and Rules enable EC Member States to Secure Budgetary Convergence?' in December 1992. 
In this workshop, a mixed group of academics and experienced practitioners from the 12 
Member States and the Commission met to analyze and discuss the above question and also 
the general consequences on national budgeting as a result of the conditions put forward by a 
future European Monetary Union. Presentations and discussions were multidisciplinary. Most 
of the relevant scientific approaches were represented: public economics, political science, 
public management and law. A special participant in this workshop was Professor Wildavsky, 
a visiting professor at EIPA at that time. The objective of the workshop was to analyze, 
discuss and suggest alternative policy-option initiatives at EC and national levels encouraging 
convergent financial management behaviour. Discussions were based on the following 
important questions: What is the current capacity of EC and national governments to manage 
public spending?'; What budgetary strategies are available to reduce deficits?'; How do social 
values and political culture affect spending patterns?'; What should the role of the Commission 
be under these circumstances?'; What is the Member States' responsibility for managing 
national budgets?'; What budgetary norms and rules should be proposed and negotiated to 
guarantee convergence of integration?'; What other orders of control should be applied and by 
whom?' and What strategic and structural arrangements could facilitate integration?'.
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A Legally Binding Treaty: Enough for Convergence?
As is well known, if the Treaty of Maastricht or a similar agreement is finally approved by the 
Member States, the Economic and Monetary Union will be one of the main courses to be taken 
for the future development of the EC. The EMU aims to create and implement a single 
currency area in which a central institution will manage monetary policy in order to achieve 
common macroeconomic objectives. Successful steps towards the EMU require convergence 
of the economic performances of Member States. One of the key criteria for convergence is 
the reduction in fiscal deficits and public debt. The Treaty specifies two conditions: 
government deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP and public-debt stock should not exceed 
60% of GDP. Most Member States have to make great efforts to keep their fiscal position in 
alignment and adjustments will require tight fiscal policy. In a transitional period a specific 
multilateral surveillance procedure will focus on budgetary performance. Avoiding excessive 
deficits will become a binding obligation and a criterion for deciding whether a country may 
be allowed to pass to the final stage.
Although legally binding, the Treaty of Maastricht has its limitations. The procedure is not 
automatic (Alexander Italianer, 1993, p 1). The final decision is reserved for judgment by 
the Council of Ministers. This means that the Maastricht norm alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee convergence. There is a need for further accompanying' rules and other positive 
measures, not only to monitor convergent budgetary behaviour in Member States but also to 
encourage voluntary strategic budgetary adaptations.
It is expected that the EMU will make the European economy more efficient and subject to 
less variability of prices and production. However, important benefits from the EMU will 
depend on how national budgeting adapts to a more demanding situation: solving domestic 
problems (budgetary autonomy), avoiding excessive deficit (budgetary discipline) and 
responding to overall EC macroeconomic policy (coordination). Budgetary discipline and 
policy coordination are vital for the EMU. Although the framework for both of these can be 
agred and set at EC level, the Community is still faced with the problem as to how appropriate 
budgetary behaviour for convergence can be encouraged at national level, assuming that this 
field should not be under specific European central control, according to the principle of 
subsidiarity. Budgetary autonomy is especially necessary, given the postulated loss of 
monetary and exchange-rate policy, as key policy instruments at national level.
Concerned countries have recently presented to the Commission convergence programmes 
with drastic reductions in public expenditures for the next few years. However, it is not 
enough merely to formulate tight budgets if there is insufficient capacity in the budgetary 
system to meet objectives. Encouraging Member States to fulfil conditions of convergence 
requires actions from the Commission establishing a general framework of budgetary 
discipline. Ensuring that norms and rules are properly negotiated and accepted at all levels of 
government is a first order of control for convergence. These parameters for budgetary 
discipline represent a preventive framework within which national governments can manage 
their own expenditure. National discretion for short-term budgetary adjustment to domestic 
needs also requires capacity from the Commission and Member States for the ex-post
monitoring of budgetary performance (second order of control). Furthermore, the Community 
and each Member State can promote positive strategic action to encourage voluntary 
convergence and design appropriate inter-organizational mechanisms for cooperation (third 
order of control).
Options for Convergent Budgeting in Member States
The Maastricht Treaty proposes norms to control fiscal performance of EC Member States. 
These norms are either criteria of substantive discipline (such as overall limits for government
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deficit and debt), procedural (i.e. EC multilateral surveillance) or institutional (decision-
making and monitoring bodies). The focus here is on complementary budgetary norms 
(specific rules, national procedures and roles of institutions) at all stages of the budgetary 
cycle and from the perspective of the role to be played both at EC and national levels.
Governmental commitment and capacity for fiscal discipline is important at all phases of the 
budgetary process: budget negotiations to allocate resources, parliamentary approval of the 
budget law and budget execution. As von Hagen's study suggests, a budgetary process under a 
dominant position of the Prime Minister or Finance Minister, with subordinated spending 
ministers, limited parliamentary amendment power and limiting changes during budget 
execution, contributes significantly to fiscal discipline. The results of his study propose a 
possible need for institutional adaptation in the budgetary process of some Member States to 
guarantee long-lasting fiscal discipline (von Hagen, 1992, pp. 37 et seq.). Strong budgetary 
leadership is a necessary complement to fiscal norms and rules for convergence.
Pointing in the same direction, Aaron Wildavsky suggests a set of norms and procedures (in 
the general sense of both words) that would facilitate strong leadership for long-lasting 
convergence within the EC (A. Wildavsky, 1992, pp. 3 et seq.). They were presented as being 
complementary to the Maastricht Treaty:  
1) outlays not to grow faster than GDP;
2) overall ceiling determined by previous year's spending multiplied by the percentage 
increases (or decrease in GDP);
3) subceilings on the above principle established on major traditional spending accounts;
4) PAYASUGO: no increase in subceilings unless accompanied by agreed cuts in outlays in 
other accounts or revenue increase;
5) no inflation premium; subceilings for coming year established by prior year's outlays;
6) quasi-entitlements; governments given authority to vary entitlement spending from 95% to 
100%;
7) governmental responsibility; (budget voted up or down as a whole).
A connected issue addressed at the workshop was the assessment of the capacity to reduce 
budgetary deficit. Is there budget flexibility in the Member States? If so, where and how? 
What is the room for manoeuvre for the finance ministries? What budgetary policy alternatives 
are available which comply with the Maastricht criteria? Two different approaches were 
chosen to discuss the answers to these questions. The first one analyzed the potential 
contribution of increasing main revenue sources and/or reducing spending categories (J. de 
Haan and C. de Kam, 1992, pp. 4 et seq). Taking into account political factors, institutional 
arrangements, budgetary procedures, etc., De Haan and De Kam suggest that there are tax and 
spending options available to each of the five countries studied. According to their research, 
some countries (The Netherlands and Denmark) have hardly any options to increase tax 
revenues. Broadening the base and eliminating reduced rates of corporate tax are open options 
for Belgium, Italy and Ireland. On the expenditure side, their research identified transfers to 
family and industry as the main target for further reductions in public outlays. For most of the 
countries studied, social security and welfare outlays showed some flexibility for reduction. 
Reducing volume or benefit rates is an important opportunity for reducing spending, although 
demographic trends, economic growth and general wage trends may influence the 
effectiveness of this policy.
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The second approach focused on suggesting changes in budget behaviour and restructuring the 
relations between the finance ministry and other budgetary actors (E. Zapico, 1992, pp. 25 et 
seq.). The Maastricht Treaty mainly focuses on correcting divergent budgetary behaviour by 
enforcing fiscal rules and norms. Main budgetary centres at national and Community levels do 
not provide positive strategic guidance for convergence except for the projection of budget 
figures and fiscal scenarios. As in other European initiatives, part of the problem of budgetary 
convergence is the lack of leadership for innovation. Strong central institutions are expected to 
play a traditional role of guardianship and arbitration.
Rejecting Non-Discipline but also Guiding Convergence
The Maastricht Treaty proposes strong legal commitment for convergence, but the credibility 
of future compliance is still low. The enforcement procedure is based on surveillance of 
multilateral peer groups. Most programmes of convergence are based on spending cuts in 
budget preparation. However, the capacity to adapt budget behaviour to the convergence 
context remains low. Although the general framework and procedure set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty for budgetary convergence are useful to avoid voluntary budgetary non-discipline, the 
hidden face of budgeting as a strategic tool should at least be considered as a complementary 
approach. Merely tightening constraints does not guarantee progress towards budgetary 
convergence. Central budget institutions have to provide guidance to adapt financial 
management behaviour to the budget context.
The Commission and national governments need to take into account the budgetary context 
within which they work in order to facilitate the appropriate adjustments. Budgetary deficits 
are not isolated from the economic, political and cultural context. Budgeting and auditing 
systems in the Member States reflect national values and preferences. Patterns of relationships 
between political values/culture and budgeting are highly useful for explaining public deficits. 
If there is no capacity for managing public spending, it will be impossible to establish the self-
control of national and Community budgetary deficits.
Declining resources and uncertainty have provoked what Professor Wildavsky has identified 
as repetitive budgeting. Frequent and erratic adjustments of budgetary figures, 
interdepartmental struggles, interdependence and difficult communication necessitate theactive 
intervention of central budget units at all levels of government. The finance ministry has to 
take responsibility for budget flexibility (Les Metcalfe, Sue Richards, pp. 177 et seq.). This 
means the adaptation of the whole budgetary system. It implies not only applying budget rules, 
norms and hierarchy but also leading the inter-organizational development of budget networks. 
Under these circumstances, the main budget centres have to play a new role, which is quite 
different to the traditional one. Some important components of this new role have been 
identified as (1) encouraging the coherence of budgeting with strategic management, (2) 
building trust through multilateral integrative bargaining in the budget procedure, (3) 
redesigning accountability systems for organizational learning and (4) redefining budget 
effectiveness as a capacity for adapting financial management behaviour to the budget context. 
All these components of this new role apply to EC, national and subnational budgeting for 
European convergence. These and other policy options mentioned before are further 
elaborated in the papers presented at the workshop mentioned above. They, along with the 
discussions held during the colloquium, will be published by EIPA in the next few months.
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